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NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019

TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I):
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, JUNE 2, 2009, AFTERNOON
SESSION

REF: A. STATE 50910

1B. GENEVA 443 (SFO-GVA-I-001)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (U) This is SFO-GVA-I-006.

12. (U) Meeting Date: June 2, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 5:15 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

13. (S) U.S. and Russian Delegations continued the second round of START Follow-on negotiations on the afternoon of June 2, 2009 at the U.S. Mission in Geneva, Switzerland. The Russian Delegation asked questions related to the verification, duration, and further reductions beyond the START Follow-on Treaty portions of the U.S. paper entitled "Elements of the START Follow-On Treaty," which had been provided during the first round of negotiations in Moscow (REF A). The delegations also exchanged ideas pertaining to the potential format and context of the required report to the Presidents for a July Summit, but no decision was reached. The Russian Delegation suggested two documents, one a joint statement for Presidents and a second negotiator's report for foreign ministers containing a summary of negotiations. The U.S. Delegation stated that a single document for Presidents was the appropriate approach and that

the United States was inclined to conclude a more detailed report along the lines of the 1992 Joint Understanding that had been exchanged between the United States and the Russian Federation regarding the framework for the START II negotiations.

¶4. (S) The Russian Delegation also stated that any commitment for further reductions needed to be considered cautiously. Special conditions were needed for reductions to occur in the future. The U.S. Delegation stated that the issue of further reductions was important to both Presidents and needed to be discussed. The delegations agreed to meet again on the morning of June 3, 2009, to discuss the schedule of events prior to the July Summit, U.S. questions pertaining to the Russian vision paper provided earlier (REF B), and approaches to accreditation with the Swiss.

MORE RUSSIAN QUESTIONS
ON U.S. "ELEMENTS"

¶5. (S) Gottemoeller opened the meeting at the U.S. Mission and invited the Russian Delegation to continue providing questions related to the U.S. paper entitled "Elements of the START Follow-on Treaty," which the Russian Delegation had started but did not complete prior to the conclusion of the morning session (REF B). (Begin comment: The Russian paper was subsequently provided and will be sent SEPTEL (SFO-GVA-I-007). End comment.)

QUESTION 1: VERIFICATION

¶6. (S) Antonov directed attention to paragraph C of Section V entitled "Verification" of the U.S. "Elements" paper and questioned the need to have ICBMs and SLBMs subject to the treaty. He asked whether it was really reasonable to have the basic START verification provisions (such as RVOSI, data update inspections, exhibitions, and the exchange to telemetry) when there was no limit on ICBMs and SLBMs. Gottemoeller responded that such questions required further study. However, the U.S. Delegation had similar questions related to the verification procedures proposed in the Russian paper entitled "How the Russian Side Envisions the New START Treaty," so it was a question for both delegations to continue to consider.

QUESTION 2: DURATION

¶7. (S) Antonov moved to the Section in the U.S. "Elements" paper entitled "Entry into Force and Duration." The United States proposed that the duration of the treaty be 5-10 years with the period to reach limits being 3-5 years. He asked whether it would be better to establish a firm timeframe for reaching limits for eliminations, as was required by START. Gottemoeller replied that no decision had been made. START defined specific phases for eliminations, which were important to the treaty, while the Moscow Treaty did not. She suggested that this was an example of when a hybrid of the two treaties could be incorporated into the follow-on treaty.

QUESTION 3: COMMITMENT TO
NEGOTIATE FURTHER REDUCTIONS

¶8. (S) Antonov emphasized that the questions asked were only preliminary questions. The Russian Delegation wanted to better understand the U.S. approach. While Russia was opposed to some aspects of the U.S. proposal, it favored other parts. He then moved to his final question which related to the last paragraph of the U.S. non-paper on

further reductions beyond the START Follow-on Treaty. He stated that, while the inclusion of tactical nuclear warheads and the goal to eliminate all nuclear weapons were fair and the objectives were well-fixed, special conditions were needed for them to occur in the future. All of the elements were already reflected in the preamble with the reference to Article VI of the NPT, and the goal of the elimination of all nuclear weapons was clearly stated. President Obama's own words stated that perhaps the elimination of nuclear weapons would not occur in his lifetime. Therefore, the Russian Delegation was not ready to assume obligations for future negotiations on further radical reductions before the parameters of the START Follow-on Treaty were even established. It would be important to first see how the implementation of the START Follow-on Treaty progressed, cautioning that non-aligned states would claim that not enough was being done regardless of what was agreed to.

Antonov did not believe that there was a double standard. Russia was in favor of a world free of nuclear weapons, but the work to get there needed to be based on the principle of "undiminished security for all," a phrase he admittedly stole from the CFE Treaty.

¶9. (S) Gottemoeller reminded Antonov that the issue of further reductions was important to both Presidents, considering that it had been part of President Obama's Prague speech and President Medvedev's Helsinki speech. The issue was inescapable, so the importance of tackling it before the NPT Review Conference next year must be recognized. She pointed out that the term that Antonov had used, obligation, had a legally-binding feel to it, whereas the United States looked at it as being a commitment, which would be politically-binding. In either case, Russia and the United States must continue to consider this issue and should commit to it.

THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENTS

¶10. (S) Antonov concluded the afternoon session with a presentation on the view of the Russian Delegation as to what a report by the negotiators to the Presidents at the July Summit in Moscow might look like. He said that both delegations needed to concentrate on a shared view for a joint document outlining the progress made during the negotiations for the Presidents to possibly sign in July. The document could take the form of a Joint Statement, a Joint Communique, or an Aide Memoire and he was flexible on what it might be called. Antonov explained that there also needed to be a second document, which would be the negotiators' report that would be submitted to the foreign ministers, who would then pass it on to their respective Presidents. The report to the ministers would be a brief summary of the results of the sessions held to date.

¶11. (S) Regarding the report to the Presidents, Antonov stated that the report would confirm the mandate from the Presidents and fix the objectives of a START Follow-on Treaty. The report should be a brief, concise document, possibly consisting of only three paragraphs. The first paragraph would summarize the progress made during the first stage of the negotiations. The second paragraph would reconfirm the mandate to continue efforts to reach agreement on a treaty and could include agreed numbers associated with the aggregate ceilings on strategic nuclear warheads and strategic delivery vehicles. However, agreed numbers were not required for this report and their absence would not be considered to be a failure. The third paragraph would identify the specific tasks to be achieved by the negotiators. Well understood phrases should be used, but modified as necessary. Antonov continuously emphasized that he was open to U.S. proposals regarding this important report.

¶12. (S) In response to Antonov's question about what the United States envisioned for the joint statement,

Gottemoeller offered that the United States was inclined to conclude a more detailed report along the lines of the 1992 Joint Understanding that had been exchanged between the United States and the Russian Federation regarding the

framework for the START II negotiations. Such a report should discuss concrete elements to be included in the potential treaty under negotiation, including the key aggregate ceilings as appropriate. Antonov cautioned against trying to agree on specific numerical limitations in the short time remaining before the Summit, given the existence of apparent differences by the two Sides on a number of issues.

¶13. (S) Responding to Gottemoeller's question as to how a report to ministers related to the report to the Presidents, Antonov said that the negotiators needed to go through their respective ministers, who have direct access to the Presidents. As such, he foresaw the document only being a couple of sentences reporting that the negotiators had fulfilled their directive and reporting progress towards that end.

¶14. (U) Documents exchanged. None.

¶15. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Ms. Gottemoeller
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
LtCol Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Fortier
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kron
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Dr. Warner
Ms. Gross (Int)
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Belyakov
Mr. Ermakov
Mr. Ilin
Ms. Ivanova
Mr. Izrazov
Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Lychaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Schevtchenko
Mr. Semin
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Trifonov
Mr. Ubeev
Mr. Vasiliev
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

Mr. Lakeev (Int)

¶16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
STORELLA